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The Courts' Response to the Reagan

Civil Rights Agenda
Drew S. Days, III*
The Reagan Administration came to Washington, D.C. committed
to reintroducing traditional theories of civil rights enforcement. The
thesis of this Essay is that the Administration's efforts concerning the
enforcement of civil rights were not successful. Of course, only time will
tell whether civil rights jurisprudence will be altered because of forces
set in motion by the Administration and changes in the makeup of the
judiciary.
Using the United States v. Carotene Products Co.' decision as the
point of departure for a consideration of twentieth-century civil rights
doctrine, it is apparent that the original goal of the Supreme Court's
civil rights policy was to prevent governments from engaging in intentionally discriminatory practices designed to harm politically defenseless racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. This traditional vision of civil
rights enforcement shaped the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,2 which struck down separate but equal segregated
public education, as well as other decisions made by the Supreme Court
during the mid-1950s0 which held various other segregative practices
unconstitutional. For the most part, Congress had this traditional vision
of civil rights enforcement in mind when it enacted the early modern
civil rights statutes, including the Equal Pay Act,4 the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,1 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.6
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. A.B., Hamilton College, 1963; LL.B., Yale Law School,
1966. Professor Days was the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights at the United States
Department of Justice from 1977 to 1981.
1. 304 U.S. 144 (1938); see Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of
Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S.
877 (1955) (beaches); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses).
4. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1982)).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1975a to 1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1982)).
6. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982)).
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These modern statutes extended nondiscrimination requirements
to previously unaffected private entities and reinforced constitutional
strictures against public actors in the areas of employment, public accommodations, housing, and education. The courts construed these
statutes initially to reach only intentionally discriminatory practices.' A
literal reading of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and these modern civil rights statutes supported this construction, because the "person" and the "individual" seemed to be the focus
of these statutory prohibitions against discrimination.' Furthermore,
the primary goal of civil rights enforcement during this period-remedying blatant, unsophisticated practices designed to deny
ethnic minorities (particularly blacks) and women equal access to a variety of public and private opportunities-was consistent with an approach focusing on intentional discrimination.'
Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, two major changes in civil
rights enforcement theory occurred. The first change related to the issue of intent. Until then, illegal or unconstitutional discrimination generally was thought to require an intent by the violator to discriminate
against the victim on racial or other impermissible grounds. 10 The 1965
Voting Rights Act" introduced a new theory of liability: Discriminatory
effect, without any proof of discriminatory intent, could render certain
electoral practices illegal.
The Voting Rights Act created a mechanism that required jurisdictions covered by its provisions to obtain "preclearance," or prior approval, from the United States Department of Justice before making
any changes in the practices affecting voting which were in force at the
time that the Act went into effect. 2 Under this provision, the Attorney
General must deny approval when the proposed change has either the
7. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 251 (M.D.N.C. 1968), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd in part, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. The fourteenth amendment provides, in part, that "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 703 (a) of Title VII provides in relevant part: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, set, or
national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
9. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the
constitutionality of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's prohibition against racial segregation or discrimination in places of public accommodation).
10. See, e.g., Griggs, 292 F. Supp. at 251.
11. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)).
12. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, Pub. L. No. 94-73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1973(b) (1982)). Alternatively, the jurisdiction desiring preclearance may seek approval from a special three-judge court in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
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purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of race. In other words,
the submitting jurisdiction has to establish both that its proposed
change is not designed to disadvantage racial or ethnic minorities, and
that the consequences of the change will not create such a
disadvantage.1"
This new approach to civil rights enforcement was introduced in
order to "shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators
of the evil to its victims. '14 Earlier federal voting rights laws looked to
judicial enforcement by the Justice Department in order to attack discriminatory voting practices. After each victory in court, however, the
prohibited practice quickly was replaced by another, perhaps equally
illegal, practice that eventually would prompt another federal lawsuit.1 5
The Act's emphasis on preventing discriminatory effects reflected the
changing view of the nature of discrimination; namely, that discrimination flows not only from individuals but also from certain institutional
arrangements which, whatever the motive for their establishment, disadvantage racial minority group members and women.
This insight into the institutionalized character of discrimination
undoubtedly informed the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co."' There, the Court held that Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act prohibited not only employment practices that intentionally
denied job opportunities on the basis of race or other characteristics,
but also those employment practices that had a "disparate" or disproportionate impact on racial minorities or women. Employment practices
having a disparate impact would be tolerated only if employers could
show that the practice was "job related" or justified by "business necessity." Relying on Griggs, courts have struck down a variety of objective
employment requirements on the ground that they have a disparate impact and are not shown to be "job related." Examples of prohibited
objective employment criteria include cutoff scores on aptitude tests,
minimum height and weight requirements, and the absence of an arrest
record. 17
13. For a description of how the preclearance process operates, see City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
14. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327-28 (1966) (upholding the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act).
15. Voting Rights: Hearingson S. 1564, to Enforce the 15th Amendment to the Constitution
of the U.S. Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1965) (testimony of Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General).
16. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see id. at 431.
17. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (aptitude tests); see also
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements); Gregory v. Litton
Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (arrest record), aff'd as modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th
Cir. 1972).
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The "disparate impact" test articulated in Griggs also has been applied in federal court cases involving other civil rights statutes. In particular, the courts have approved the disparate impact test in the
context of the Fair Housing Act' s and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.'- Like Title VII, but unlike the 1965 Voting Rights Act, these
statutes do not speak explicitly to the question of whether discriminatory effects are included in the statutory prohibitions. Courts have justified their interpretations that practices having discriminatory effects
are prohibited by reference to their duty to read civil rights statutes
liberally. 0
Griggs, however, did more than uncouple modern civil rights statutes from the previous emphasis on discriminatory intent. Griggs also
moved the focus of employment discrimination prohibitions from the
individual victims to racial or ethnic groups or women as a whole.2
This shift can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose that a
black man applies for a job which requires some college education. If a
college education is a required employment criterion and the black applicant is rejected on that basis, his chances of establishing that he was
the victim of intentional discrimination are weak. However, if the black
man and a number of other blacks without any college training apply
and all are rejected, they may have a claim of disparate impact. In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the black plaintiffs must show that blacks are rejected disproportionately for failing to
meet the educational criterion. Under Griggs, however, the employer
may defend the educational criterion by establishing that a college education correlates significantly with satisfactory performance on the job.
If the employer cannot make this required showing, he has violated Title VII and may be required to offer jobs to members of the plaintiff
class.
The second major change in civil rights enforcement beginning in
the late 1960s related to the nature of remedies for discriminatory practices. Just as the courts and administrative agencies, whether applying
18. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
19. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). In Guardians a plurality of
the Court agreed that the disparate impact standard, even if not authorized by the letter of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 itself, could be adopted as the applicable test where it had been
incorporated in federal agency regulations.
20. See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1289 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
97 (1971)).
21. See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. RE V. 59, 89-90 (1972) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's holding covers not only incumbent employees but also minority applicants for
employment).
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the Constitution or civil rights statutes, historically focused on intentional violations of antidiscrimination principles, the remedies employed to rectify violations were equally straightforward. The person
found guilty of discriminating on the basis of an impermissible criterion
was enjoined from discriminating in the future and those persons denied opportunities because of the violator's discrimination were allowed
to attend the all-white school, to work at the all-white factory, or to
cast a ballot.22 Similar remedies were fashioned for victims of other
kinds of discrimination. These remedies were characterized by their relative simplicity and by the absence of any reliance on racial or other
criteria.
These remedies, however, failed to dismantle entrenched patterns
of segregation and exclusion effectively. Granting black children the
right to attend previously all-white schools or a black job applicant the
right to work at a once segregated plant did not necessarily produce
desegregated school systems or integrated workplaces. Recognizing the
ineffectiveness of these traditional remedies, courts and administrative
agencies began to order remedies, particularly in school desegregation,
employment, and voting cases, that relied explicitly on racial or other
group characteristics. For example, student assignment plans designed
to achieve racial proportions in each school that approximated systemwide ratios were formulated," and employers found liable under Title VII were required to meet goals and timetables for employing and
promoting racial minorities and women. 24 Additionally, redistricting in
voting rights cases sought to eliminate the racial consequences of various configurations.25 Voluntary affirmative action plans in higher education, employment, and public contracting also used methods that
specifically considered race and sex criteria. Challenges to these explicit
uses of race and sex criteria generally have failed. 21 Courts and administrative agencies essentially looked beyond the text of the Constitution
and modern civil rights statutes and held that such arrangements were
justified by the underlying purposes of those provisions. They argued
22. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (school desegregation); Jenkins v. United
Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968) (employment).
23. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
24. See Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895

(1974).
25. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (public contracting); United Steel
Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (higher education). Although the Supreme Court struck down the race-conscious admissions
plan at issue in Bakke, challenges to the use of race as an admissions criterion in subsequent cases
have been unsuccessful. See Days, Minority Access to Higher Education in the Post-Bakke Era,
55 U. COLO. L. Rev. 491, 495-99 (1984).
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that both constitutional and statutory strictures against discrimination
originally were designed to address the plight of blacks. Consequently,
the explicit use of race in fashioning a remedy to ameliorate the plight
of blacks could not be reasonably viewed as raising any problems of
discrimination."
The Reagan Administration encountered this world of civil rights
enforcement, recognized and promoted by several prior Presidential administrations, and was determined to change it profoundly. Administration officials believed that a legally wrong and politically wrongheaded
shift had occurred in civil rights enforcement in the late 1960s and the
early 1970s and that this transformation required immediate
correction.2"
Harking back to earlier theories of discrimination, the Administration sought to refocus civil rights enforcement on blatant, intentional
violations of federal civil rights laws or the Constitution. Standing
alone, this shift in policy is not particularly noteworthy. Certainly, no
one who is committed to civil rights enforcement can quarrel with a
vigorous federal assault on intentional forms of discrimination. For
Reagan Administration officials, however, this shift in policy had a
corollary: Enforcement of civil rights laws utilizing concepts of "discriminatory effect" or "disparate impact" should be de-emphasized.2 s
This de-emphasis was necessary, in their view, because these concepts
were at war with the fundamental aim of the civil rights laws-the punishment of bad actors. Consequently, the Administration focused its efforts on returning the law to punishing those actors who intentionally
discriminated.
27. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 204-08 (construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
allow a race-conscious training program despite the apparent conflict between that reading and
language in the statute suggesting the contrary).
28. For a full discussion of the Reagan Administration's position on civil rights, see Days,
Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administrationand Civil Rights, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
309 (1984). For an exchange between Mr. William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights under President Reagan, and Professor Joel Selig, a former Civil Rights Division
lawyer under Presidents Nixon, Carter, and Reagan, over the shift in enforcement policies under
the Reagan Administration, see: Selig, The Reagan Justice Department and Civil Rights: What
Went Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 785; Reynolds, The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights:
Winning the War Against Discrimination, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001; and Selig, The Reagan Justice Department and Civil Rights, Professor Selig Responds to Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 431.
29. See United States v. City of Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Mich. 1982). In the
Birmingham case, the Reagan Administration, as the court's opinion notes, shifted from reliance
upon a disparate impact theory argued by the Carter Justice Department to dependence solely
upon an intent theory. Id. at 827 n.9. For a full discussion of the Carter Administration's use of the
disparate impact theory in fair housing cases, see Selig, The Justice Department and Racially
Exclusionary Municipal Practices: Creative Ventures in Fair Housing Act Enforcement, 17 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 445 (1984).
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The Administration's view of appropriate remedies for civil rights
violations also embraced early civil rights doctrine. In short, the Administration advocated that race or sex criteria should never be used for
remedial purposes.3 0 Administration officials often remarked that the
purpose of Brown was to rid our society of race-consciousness, leaving
each person to be judged based only on his merits without reference to
skin color or sex. The Constitution, according to this view, was meant to
be color-blind.' Consequently, school desegregation plans that required
assignment of students were an anathema to these officials. The Administration's position was that the constitutional mandate was satisfied
once school boards were precluded from barring any child from admission to a school because of race. 2 Similarly, affirmative action plans
that involved the setting of hiring or promotion goals, timetables, or
quotas, whether mandatory or voluntary, could not be squared with the
Administration's understanding of the Constitution or of Title VII 3
The Administration believed that only people who were "actual victims
of discrimination" should be provided any remedy under the Constitution or Title VII.3 4 Under this view, when a person has been discriminated against based upon race or other impermissible grounds, that
person should be given adequate legal or equitable redress because of
the injury experienced. However, a remedy that benefits not only the
person who has been discriminated against, but also other members of
the group to which the victim of discrimination belongs, is
inappropriate.
Although I disagree with these views, the Reagan Administration's
positions cannot be dismissed as inherently trivial. Putting to one side
the explicit invitation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act to preclude electoral changes that are discriminatory either by design or in effect, the
Supreme Court's adoption in Griggs of the "disparate impact" test for
certain Title VII claims 35 and the use of this test by lower courts in
enforcing other civil rights statutes were not unambiguous. The statutes
could be read, in light of their complex legislative histories, to address
only intentional discrimination. Similarly, certain provisions of Title
30. See Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995
(1984).
31. See generally Days, Holding the Line, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1986).
32. See Days, supra note 28, at 319-30.
33. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 998.
34. Reynolds, Justice Department Policies on Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action, 35 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 443, 444-45, 452 (1983).
35. E.g., Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Implications for Private and Public Employers, 50 TEx. L. REv. 901 (1972); Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company:
Ruminations on Job Testing Discrimination,and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV.
844 (1972).
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VII could be interpreted plausibly to preclude race-conscious employment plans, whether mandatory or voluntary. 6 Finally, the open-textured character of the equal protection clause could be interpreted to
37
exclude race-conscious remedies for nonvictims from its purview.
The Reagan Administration pursued its agenda with a single-mindedness that perhaps was unequaled by any of its recent predecessors.3 8
For example, although school desegregation doctrine affords plaintiffs
the benefit of certain evidentiary presumptions in establishing discriminatory intent, the Reagan Justice Department eschewed any reliance on
these presumptions.3 " However, the Administration's early attempts to
curtail busing for purposes of mandatory or voluntary school desegregation were resisted. In one case the Administration, in a switch from the
position taken by the Carter Justice Department in the lower courts,
argued in the Supreme Court that voluntary busing plans adopted by
several Washington State cities were unconstitutional. The Court ruled
against this argument.40 A similar setback occurred when school districts, after being approached by the Administration to alter their busing plans, rejected the offer when they learned that the revised plan
would be significantly more segregative. 41 Thereafter, with one notable
36. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that "the rights created by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights." Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
38. The Franklin Roosevelt Administration has been considered perhaps the most active
twentieth-century administration in its attempt to change the law. However, the Justice Department's role was very limited. Its involvement was largely in attempting programmatic changes in
policy. The history of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), provides just
such an example. The administrative agencies pushed the case in the courts. The Justice Department, by contrast, was extremely hesitant to litigate cases that challenged existing precedent. See
P. IRONS, THE NEw DEAL LAWYERS 86 (1982).
39. For example, Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), held that racially based actions in part of a school district may affect the whole school district. Yet Assistant
Attorney General Reynolds expressly stated that he would not use the Keyes presumption in determining which litigation to undertake. Instead, he would "define the violation precisely and seek
to limit the remedy only to those schools in which racial imbalance is the product of intentionally
segregative acts of State officials." School Desegregation:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 618 (1981)
(statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division).
40. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). For further discussion
of the Seattle case and the ethical issues presented by the Administration's action, see Note, Ethical Considerationsfor the Justice Department when It Switches Sides During Litigation, 7 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 405 (1984). See also In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment
Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1501 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming the trial court's determination that the Justice Department was collaterally estopped from attacking a consent decree entered into by a prior
administration).
41. Following the Administration's unsuccessful attempt to bring about a more segregative
desegregation plan in Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 498 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. La.
1980), the Justice Department continued to press for alternative approaches to busing. See De-
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exception," the Administration's approach in dealing with school districts previously charged as being segregated3 was to work out consent
4
decrees that entailed no mandatory busing.
In the area of housing, the Administration's docket resembled the
agenda developed by prior administrations during the ten years since
the Fair Housing Act had been passed. Basically, lawsuits were filed
against landlords and homeowners for refusing to rent or sell to interested persons based on impermissible grounds, relying on a theory of
intentional discrimination. 4 Despite extensive precedent in the lower
federal courts upholding an "effects" standard of proof, the Administration did not pursue these claims in litigation.4 5 Instead, the Administration argued that the effects test was not authorized by the Fair Housing
4

Act. "

Major amendments to the Fair Housing Act were passed by Congress in September 1988. 4 None of the changes, however, addressed the
question of whether the Act required proof of discriminatory intent.
Nevertheless, in his signing statement President Reagan argued that
partment of Justice, Press Release (February 18, 1983). Assistant Attorney General Reynolds
stated that other options were "voluntary student transfer programs, magnet schools, enhanced
curriculum requirements, faculty incentives, in-service training, training programs for teachers and
administrators, school closings in systems with excess capacity and new construction in systems
that are over-crowded, and modest adjustments in attendance zones." Court-orderedSchool Busing: Hearings on S. 528, S. 1005, S. 1147, S. 1647, S. 1743, and S. 1760 Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 582, 592-93
(1981) (statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division).
42. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988). Yonkers, a suit filed by the Carter Administration, but prosecuted by the
Reagan Justice Department, alleged both intentional school and housing segregation.
43. For example, in 1982 the Department of Education concluded that the Bakersfield, California School District was in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Justice Department worked out a consent decree approving a voluntary magnet school as an alternative to
busing. See N. AmAKER, Civm RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 40-41 (1988).
44. See, e.g., 1986 ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 129-30; 1985 Ar'y GEN. ANN. REP. 167; 1984 ATT'Y
GEN. ANN. REP. 149; 1983 AT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 136.
45. When the Reagan Administration took office, a clear majority of the Courts of Appeals
addressing the issue endorsed the discriminatory effect theory. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-49 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray
Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 808-09 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12-18, Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988) (No. 87-1961). Huntington, a case that the Administration urged the Supreme Court to accept for review to press this point, was recently affirmed on
other grounds. Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 109 S. Ct. 276, aff'g 844 F.2d
926 (2d Cir. 1988).
47. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (amending
42 U.S.C. §§ 3602, 3604-3608, 3610-3614, 3617, 3619, 3631 (1982)).
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the Act, as amended, required proof of discriminatory intent.48
Housing was not the only area in which the Reagan Administration
attempted to ensure that only intentional discrimination would be illegal under federal law. In 1980 the Supreme Court held that a provision
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, distinct from those provisions having
to do with preclearance, required proof of discriminatory intent.49 Congress ultimately responded, despite Administration opposition, by enacting an amendment to the Act that incorporated essentially an
"effects" standard. 0 Undaunted, the Administration urged the Supreme Court to adopt a reading of the provision that would have limited the reach of the new effects approach substantially.51 This move
prompted the filing with the Court of a rather unusual amicus brief,
signed by the major Senate and House sponsors of the amendment,
which challenged the Justice Department's reading of the statute.52 The
Administration's interpretation was rejected by the Court.53
The Administration's efforts to restrict the application of the
Griggs disparate impact test in Title VII employment discrimination
cases also have been unsuccessful. While not unambiguous given the
complexity of the opinion, I read the Administration's position in the
48. In his signing statement, President Reagan stated:
At the same time, I want to emphasize that this bill does not represent any congressional or
executive branch endorsement of the notion, expressed in some judicial opinions, that title 8
violations may be established by a showing of disparate impact or discriminatory effects of a
practice that is taken without discriminatory intent. Title 8 speaks only to intentional
discrimination.
Remarks on Signing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
1140, 1141 (Sept. 13, 1988).
49. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
50. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973aa (1982)). Section 2(a) of the Act reads in pertinent part as
follows:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial
or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color...
Id. sec. 3, § 2(a), 96 Stat. at 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982)) (emphasis
added); see Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the
Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. Rzv. 715 (1983).
51. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 6-19, Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (No. 83-1968). Thornburg was the first case to reach the Supreme
Court under the amended Act.
52. Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Senators Dennis DeConcini, Robert J. Dole,
Charles E. Grassley, Edward M. Kennedy, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., and Howard M. Metzenbaum, and Representatives Don Edwards, Hamilton Fish, Jr., Peter W. Rodino, Jr., and F. James
Sensenbrenner as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)
(No. 83-1968).
53. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 77-79.
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1982 case of Connecticut v. Teal" as an effort to shift the focus from
whether an employment practice has a disparate impact to whether the
overall hiring process reflects a lack of discriminatory intent.55 In addition, I read the Court's decision as an outright rejection of the Administration's proposed shift.58 Additionally, the Supreme Court last term
apparently rejected the Administration's argument that the Griggs test
should not be extended to cover subjective hiring or promotion systems
that have a disparate impact.57 Until that ruling, lower courts had been
in conflict over whether the Griggs disparate impact test was limited to
situations in which objective screening devices disproportionately excluded minority or female candidates."' The exact contours of this ruling will have to be shaped in later decisions.5 At this writing, however,
it appears that Griggs has been extended rather than curtailed.
Given its concern for a color-blind Constitution and for bars under
Title VII to race-conscious programs, the Reagan Administration devoted extensive time, energy, and resources to challenging affirmative
action plans. In evaluating how successful the Administration was in its
opposition to affirmative action plans, seven Supreme Court decisions
are relevant. Six of these cases were decided during President Reagan's
tenure.6 0 The seventh case, in which the Reagan Justice Department
was involved heavily, was decided only three days after the Bush Administration took office.6 1
54. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
55. In Teal, the Reagan Administration argued that Title VII was not violated by an employer whose overall "bottom line" employment practices did not have a disparate impact even
when a component of its personnel process, such as a standardized aptitude test, did disproportionately screen out racial minorities or women. Id. at 451-55, 453 n.12. Implicit in the Administration's position was that the employer's bottom line negated any suggestion of discriminatory intent
and that, therefore, the overall objective of Title VII was fully achieved. See id.
56. The Teal Court held that Title VII is violated when disparate impact is shown in one
aspect of the employment process despite an end result with no disparate impact. In fairness to
the Reagan Administration's position in this case, the Court was badly split over the issue and was
criticized by commentators generally committed to the retention in most instances of the Griggs
disparate impact test. See, e.g., Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination and Legislative Intent: The Fallacyof Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HAv. J. ON LEGIS. 99 (1983);
Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: DisparateImpact Theory and the
Demise of the Bottom Line Principle,31 UCLA L. REv. 305 (1983).
57. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
58. See, e.g., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc),
cert. granted in part, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985); Segar
v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir., 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
59. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to consider this question. See Wards Cove
Packing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2896.
60. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986);
Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
61. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
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The first of these decisions involved efforts by lower federal courts
to protect the jobs of black fire fighters, recently hired pursuant to a
consent decree, who were facing layoffs.12 The Supreme Court struck
down this scheme on the ground that the lower courts' modification of
the consent decree violated the seniority rights of white workers who
were scheduled to be laid off instead of more junior blacks.6 Extracting
language from this opinion which appeared to support its view that Title VII prohibited the granting of any remedies to nonvictims, the Administration notified over fifty jurisdictions that their consent decrees
were illegal. Its subsequent attempts to have these decrees, which had
been entered into with earlier administrations, declared illegal were rejected by every Court of Appeals in the country. The only cases in
which the Justice Department prevailed involved overrides of seniority
systems. 4
Nevertheless, the Administration brought its argument about
nonvictims to the Supreme Court. However, in an opinion that upheld a
remedial race-conscious plan, seven Justices, one of whom was in dissent on the merits, rejected the Administration's position."' In another
case decided the same day, the Court upheld a consent decree that contained race-conscious provisions, despite the Administration's opposition."' While the Court subsequently struck down as unconstitutional a
voluntary affirmative action plan that required proportional layoffs of
white and minority teachers irrespective of seniority, 7 the Court did
not reject the use of race as a criterion in voluntary affirmative action
plans. Rather, the Court set out the requirements that such a plan
would have to satisfy in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.68 In
addition, the Court upheld as constitutional one-for-one promotions of
black and white state troopers as a remedy for long-standing employ62. See Stotts, 467 U.S. 561.
63. Id. at 572-83.
64. See N. AMAKER, supra note 43, at 126; Goldberg, Waitingfor Wygant- Affirmative Action
in the Aftermath of Stotts, 1985 PROC. N.Y.U. 38th ANN. NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. 19-1, §§ 19.04-.05.
65. Sheet Metal Workers', 478 U.S. 421. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
held that the legislative history does not indicate that Congress intended that affirmative relief
under § 706(g) of Title VII benefit only the identified victims of past discrimination. Id. at 444-79
(Brennan, J., plurality). Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, agreed that § 706(g) does not limit
a court to granting relief only to actual victims of discrimination. Id. at 483 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor was concerned that the Court appeared to disregard dicta in Stotts that
embodied a policy against such nonvictim remedies. Id. at 489-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). She stated, however, that these remedies may be available if they are truly
necessary. Id. at 496. Justice White dissented on the merits, but agreed that § 706(g) does not bar
relief for nonvictims. Id. at 499 (White, J., dissenting).
66. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501.
67. Wygant, 476 U.S. 267.
68. Id. at 274-84.
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ment discrimination.6 9
The Reagan Administration also sought to overturn a 1979 decision
that upheld a voluntary race-conscious hiring and promotion program
as consistent with Title VII. 70 Despite the Administration's efforts to
achieve this result, the 1979 decision was reaffirmed and expanded in a
1987 opinion in which six members of the Court rejected the Administration's position.71 One of the concurring Justices, however, voted with
72
the majority largely on grounds of stare decisis.
The most recent affirmative action decision by the Supreme Court,
rendered on January 23, 1989, held unconstitutional a minority setaside program that ensured minority business enterprises a fixed percentage of public works or procurement contracts.7 The Court asserted
that the plan was constitutionally infirm because it did not appear to be
based on any evidence of discrimination against minority businesses in
the jurisdiction and, even if it was, the plan was not tailored narrowly
to respond to that discrimination. 74 The Reagan Administration had argued for this result. Minority set-aside programs, however, were not
prohibited entirely. 75 Given the fragmented nature of the decision, the
only clear statement which comes from the opinion is that for the first
time five Justices voted in favor of strict scrutiny as the standard of
76
review for race-conscious programs.
Thus, the Administration's position has been vindicated in only
three of the last seven affirmative action cases. Admittedly, in those
three cases, as well as in at least one of the cases that, on the merits,
went against the Administration's position,77 the Court did articulate
tighter standards governing race-conscious plans than had existed previously. But on the Administration's core challenges, namely the issues
of general race-conscious remedies and the treatment of nonvictims
69. Paradise,480 U.S. 149.
70. See Taylor, Civil Rights Division Head Will Seek Supreme Court Ban on Affirmative
Action, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1981, at 4, col. 2.
71. Johnson, 480 U.S. 616.
72. Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring).
73. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
74. Id. at 723-29.
75. In fact, four of the Justices who voted to strike down the Richmond set-aside, Justices
O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy, suggested that "[i]n the extreme case, some form of
narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion." Id. at 729 (O'Conner, J., plurality). Since Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun voted
to uphold the set-aside, there appears to be a majority on the Court for the proposition that
nonvictims may be benefited. See id. at 754-55 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 720-21; id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring).
77. See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. 421. In Sheet Metal Workers, the Court established
that remedies that benefit nonvictims should be used only to remedy "persistent or egregious discrimination, or when necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." Id. at
445 (Brennan, J., plurality); see also Paradise,480 U.S. 149.
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particularly, the Court remained unpersuaded.
What conclusions can be drawn from these recent affirmative action decisions? I assert that these decisions reflect significant judicial
resistance to an Administration bent on making dramatic changes in
civil rights doctrines. Even if lower court judges or Justices of the Supreme Court found the Administration's arguments politically attractive in specific cases, I believe that the lack of solid legal or factual
support for the Administration's position in some instances, and the
pull of stare decisis, particularly in statutory cases, caused them to rule
against the Administration's arguments.
As I suggested at the outset of this Essay, given the recent changes
in the Court's composition and the likelihood that new appointments
soon will be made, the Reagan civil rights agenda finally may receive a
favorable hearing.7 5 Judging the situation at this juncture, however, few
fundamental changes in civil rights enforcement occurred during the
eight years of the Reagan Administration.

78. I suggested an explanation for the Reagan Justice Department's persistence in the face of
defeat in an earlier article:
The answer, I think, is that they do not expect to win in the law courts in the near future.
Rather, they hope to win in the court of public opinion and to transform the national debate
in a way that will have consequences inside and outside of the courts with respect to civil
rights policy long after they have left office.
Days, supra note 31, at 7.

